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War Colleges: A Debate

Making the War Colleges Better
Richard A. Lacquement Jr.

N

o surprise. I am a big fan of war colleges . . . particularly the
US Army War College (USAWC). The United States needs war
colleges, all six and then some, to develop national security—
especially military—expertise to serve US interests and values. All the war
colleges are joint. But to the extent they differ, each has a comparative
advantage our joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational
endeavors need.
More precisely, the separate war colleges represent specialized
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, economic, and national policy
expertise while promulgating common joint elements. In typical US
military manner, this joint-but-not-unified approach to senior-service
war college education leads to healthy competition. In some regards,
such an approach is not efficient (like jointness itself). But effectiveness
is the more important standard for analyzing war colleges.
War colleges make exceptional contributions to American national
security through the leaders and ideas they produce. We should
strengthen war colleges’ effectiveness through improvements to faculty,
curriculum, and outreach. We must pursue improvements to the broader
framework of talent management affecting how we select and prepare
faculty and students as well as managing how faculty members and
graduates subsequently serve society. My aspiration is that dialogue
will advance war college endeavors, with close attention to the dynamic
international security environment.
This article has three main components. The first lays out the
argument for war colleges, emphasizing answers developed at the
USAWC regarding what we think it takes to effectively meet American
society’s security needs. The second picks up the challenge from
Hooker about “Taking the War Colleges from Good to Great,” a useful,
somewhat incomplete, and sometimes off-the-mark contribution in
which I find more to laud than criticize. The third and final section
offers additional recommendations toward making war colleges better.

Mission and Structure: The Why and How of War Colleges

Let us put the war colleges in context before focusing on how to
improve them. The mission of war colleges is to educate and develop
senior leaders for service in high-level national security assignments. War
colleges are professional schools situated within an extensive ecosystem
of professional military education (PME). Each was created by one of
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the US government’s military departments to meet vital professional
needs, and they are funded and staffed for parochial but society-focused
reasons.
The Navy Department established the Naval War College in 1884.
The War Department established the USAWC in 1901, and the Industrial
College of the Army Forces—now the Eisenhower School for National
Security and Resource Strategy—in 1924. General Eisenhower, then
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, established the National War
College in 1946. The War Department established the Air War College
in 1946, and the Marine Corps established Marine Corps University in
1991. Their missions, as with their parent organizations, aim to serve the
American people—their ultimate clients.
These six war colleges are not the only source for senior-level military
education. There are a handful of smaller programs that provide joint
senior-level education required for promotion to US military general/
flag officer ranks. The US Army also has a program for selected officers
to participate in fellowships for senior education that do not result
in joint professional military education (JPME) credit. To be eligible
for promotion to general/flag officer, USAWC Fellows must attain
JPME II credentials, most commonly through a 10-week program at the
Joint Forces Staff College.
Unlike most civilian academic institutions, war colleges are not
structured to compete for students and measure value in an open
employment market. Rather than enticing students to choose a school
to develop skills for future employment, war colleges start with students
who are already established professionals within the organizations that
fund and populate the schools. As such, the students are not the clients.
Rather, the students embody the expert talent PME programs further
develop to meet the needs of society—the true client.
War college personnel, facilities, and other resources come primarily
from tax dollars via the Department of Defense (DoD) budget.
Consequently, war colleges are guided by professional obligations to
society’s national security needs rather than the needs of individual
students or other market or business demands. This is a significant point
in that it affects almost everything about the manner in which policies
govern faculty, students, and curricula.
War colleges focus on the expert knowledge professionals require for
established military jurisdictions of practice—such as war, deterrence,
stability operations, and support to civil authorities, among others—and
adjudicate new jurisdictions such as cyber and space. Academic rigor
promulgates professional expertise. But the programs are not primarily
academic. With a step or two of logic, however, we may confidently
state students attend war college due to our society’s national security
requirements.
Befitting professional schools, faculty predominantly come from
national security community backgrounds. Faculties include active
and retired military and civilian national security professionals and are
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supplemented by civilians with academic credentials in related fields
of study, such as political science, especially the subfields of security
studies, foreign policy, American politics, and regional studies; history,
especially military; psychology, especially leadership; and business
management, especially resource and human capital management.
The preponderance of students are senior-level military officers—
primarily grades O-5 and O-6. War colleges include similarly
high-ranking military officers from allied or partner nations, and senior
civilians from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and other organizations in
the Department of Defense. Other national security professionals from
non-DoD executive departments, most prominently the Department of
State, intelligence community, and Department of Homeland Security,
also attend. The US, allied, or partner-nation governments pay for their
senior professionals to attend war colleges. Students do not pay tuition
to attend. To the degree students incur a personal cost, it is commonly in
terms of additional time they must serve their organizations subsequent
to attendance. In the Army, for example, this amounts to an additional
year of active-duty service obligation.
Student selection, which is typically competitive, is primarily a
function of each organizations’ personnel systems and policies. In the
competitive up-or-out world of US Army officers, thousands of officers
are assessed as lieutenants. About 16 years later, less than 15 percent are
competitively selected for promotion to lieutenant colonel (O-5), the
most junior rank at which an officer may be competitively selected for
war college attendance. By about 22 years, less than five percent of that
initial cohort earn promotion to colonel (O-6).
The war colleges have a dual nature. They produce both leaders
and ideas. War colleges do not promulgate a fixed, unchanging body of
knowledge merely to be mastered and applied. Yes, there are many lessons,
insights, frameworks, rules, theories, doctrine, and readily applicable
techniques that guide war college graduates’ discretionary judgment.
But no, war colleges have not solved national security equations once
and for all. Moreover, the equations themselves shift as some variables
decline in significance, although very few disappear completely, and new
variables emerge. The vast number of variables relevant to professional
judgment create a premium for generalists to serve at the apex of their
professions without discounting essential contributions of specialization
among and within organizations.
The priority of the three important factors contributing to the
mission of war colleges is faculty, curriculum, and then outreach. But
all three are indispensable to success and none can be neglected. The
faculty is the center of gravity for understanding the needs of the
national security profession, identifying and developing appropriate
expertise, and promulgating this expertise through the education and
development of future leaders. The faculty and staff work closely with
stakeholders who represent society, primarily within the executive and
legislative branches of government but also at the state level.
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The curriculum represents the body of expert knowledge that rising
national security professionals must master to meet their responsibilities
to society. The curriculum is a living body of expertise. Faculty and
students have a responsibility to learn and master that expertise and
challenge, research, and innovate to ensure expertise remains relevant
to society’s interests and values within a dynamic security environment.
The third is outreach. Students and faculty must stay connected
with those they serve. It is important for war college students, staff,
and faculty to understand the strategic environment and its challenges.
Faculty and students engage in outreach to provide insights, perspectives,
and recommendations to shape policy and strategy.
The war colleges are not the only institutions that provide national
security education. Within the Department of Defense, the Naval
Post-graduate School, the Air Force Institute of Technology, and some
other DoD education and development institutions also provide joint
education at the senior level. But no major counterpart to DoD education
and development exists elsewhere in the executive branch. The State
Department, for example, has some educational programs for midcareer
professionals but nothing as extensive as JPME.
The civilian academic community also has an array of academic
programs that provide education, and some development, relevant to
the national security establishment. Public policy programs and business
schools may address academic topics relevant to national security
professionals. But these programs are not sufficient for society’s national
security needs.
High-quality public policy schools, such as Princeton’s Woodrow
Wilson School and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies, offer wonderful graduate programs that predominantly support
the development and certification of junior students who aspire to
become professionals in the public service realm, including the national
security community. Business schools, such as the University of
Pennsylvania’s Wharton School and Northwestern’s Kellogg School of
Management, provide valuable complementary programs that deal with
large enterprises in the market-driven economy. Yet both public policy
and business schools typically cater to individual student customers.

The Challenge: “Taking the War Colleges from Good to Great”

Hooker’s welcome addition to the literature is a praiseworthy,
thoughtful analysis. I strongly agree with the overall theme and the
spirit behind Hooker’s recommendations to make war colleges better.
Furthermore, the categories he concentrates on—students, faculty, and
curriculum—are important. I also agree the focus must be on what the
nation and its taxpayers deserve.
The author provides helpful suggestions—greater attention to war
college faculty assignments and composition; strengthening faculty
teaching, scholarship, and service; greater attentiveness to student
selection; better tailoring war college opportunities to accord with
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student and organizational demands; and continued attention to war
college curricular rigor and scope, including how to keep pace with key
contemporary challenges. I also endorse Hooker’s implicit point that
academic and professional standards are complementary. On the other
hand, I find his focus on academic rather than professional standards
unbalanced.
My strongest critique is that Hooker introduces major distortions
by emphasizing academic over professional standards. Academic and
professional standards are not mutually exclusive. But the distinction is
important. Part of the problem is Hooker unduly focuses on unspecified
civilian academic programs as the primary comparison for war colleges.
Generally he tends to focus on the master’s degrees war colleges award
in drawing comparisons to civilian programs.
This comparison between civilian and military education is
inapt for two main reasons. First, even when comparing war college
curricula with other civilian professional programs such as business,
law, medicine, and public policy, a salient difference exists in the nature
of the body of knowledge such programs impart to their professionals.
Most professional schools focus on a well-defined, specialized body of
knowledge within which the judgment of professionals is delimited—
medical professionals and health, legal professionals and law, business
professionals and profits. Such programs focus on specialization.
For the military, the development of senior professionals focuses
on a broader and more general body of knowledge encompassing a wide
array of human dynamics and fundamental threats to life and security
in a context of actual or potential violence. The closest parallel to war
colleges may be public policy schools that weave interdisciplinary
economics, governance, and politics. These may have been the schools
Hooker had in mind—but he should be specific. Military services have
long included such schools as part of professional development pathways.
I graduated from one myself, and I know many other war college faculty
members—civilian and military—who are products of such programs.
Second, with few exceptions, civilian graduate programs are
designed for students seeking basic professional qualifications (law
school as a means to practice law, medical schools as the means to
practice medicine). The same is generally true of business and public
policy schools where the preponderance of students are in the entry or
early stages of professional careers, and these schools serve as venues
to develop basic expertise for careers of practice. Nevertheless, there is
sometimes a parallel between war colleges and business or public policy
schools when the latter provide programs for midcareer professionals. A
more appropriate comparison is likely that of war college graduation rates
and retention with such midcareer master’s programs rather than with
either undergraduate- or entry- level professional graduate schooling.
Several points in the article beg for correction or clarification.
Among the minor points in need of correction or elaboration
are assertions about jointness, program length, competitive selection,
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academic standards, elective choices, the value of war college experience
to future student and faculty assignments, and one-size-fits-all
characterizations.
To start with, all war colleges are joint—not just National and
Eisenhower. For the services, JPME credit may not be the predominant
focus, but it is a statutory requirement as it is for National Defense
University programs. Hooker also only references the 10-month
programs common to resident education across war colleges and fails to
recognize the nature, structure, and contributions of distance programs,
such as those at the Naval War College, Air War College, Joint Forces
Staff College, and the Army War College that support a substantial
population of reserve component students associated with the federal
reserves and National Guard. Furthermore, although not necessarily
available to all distance students, a substantial subset of students in the
Army War College’s 2-year distance education program also earn JPME
II qualifications and a master’s degree—just like students in the resident
program.
The assertion students do not compete for admission to war
colleges is only partly accurate. True, there are no individual application
requirements similar to military service academies or typical civilian
undergraduate and graduate programs. Conceptually, such programs
differ from war colleges as gatekeepers to particular professions. In
contrast, war colleges focus on developing and educating seasoned
professionals for additional responsibilities. The dominance of
professional, organizational imperatives in the war colleges’ missions
have few parallels to civilian programs.
As noted earlier, in a broader context, war college students do
compete for attendance. The competition for war college student
selection is institutional. The services typically compare performance
and potential across officers’ entire careers when deciding who to select
for war college attendance. For the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps,
the selection is centralized. For all students, selection for attendance is
made by organizations or countries to which student quotas have been
allocated. Prerequisites of rank (O-5 or O-6) and the possession of a
bachelor’s degree mark a high baseline for the quality of the student
body.
I find the assertion about war colleges not meeting academic
standards puzzling. As Hooker points out, the master’s degrees war
colleges award are accredited by the same regional accreditation bodies
as civilian graduate schools. Further, all war colleges must continue to
meet civilian graduate degree standards to retain accreditation, just as
the USAWC did in 2019 to fulfill the Middle States Commission on
Higher Education requirements for eight more years of accreditation.
The claim war colleges fail to accommodate student choice also
seems off the mark. True, the interests of the organizations selecting
midcareer professionals for war college attendance dominate. And
selections are governed by a quota, particularly among the military
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services, to ensure all war college student bodies have an appropriately
joint, interagency, and multinational character. But for many individuals,
personal preference is a major factor. Talent management opportunities
include the choice of which war college an individual attends.
Once students arrive at a war college, they have many other choices.
And each war college has dynamics to reconcile such student choice
with institutional requirements. All offer elective courses as part of
their educational programs. At the USAWC, in addition to electives,
there are several special programs subject to competitive selection in
which more than a quarter of students participate. Although the core
curriculum demands the majority of students’ time, we have found
several ways to tailor each educational experience. We intend to expand
such opportunities in coming years.
Major offerings include the Carlisle Scholars Program (defense
research and writing); the Advanced Strategic Art Program (nationallevel military policy, strategy, and campaigning); the National
Security Policy Program (the nexus of national security policy and
strategy development); the Advanced Defense Management Program
(DoD resources management); the Joint Land Air Sea Space exercise
(JLASS-EX) that culminates with a war game involving students from
several war colleges; the Futures seminar that supports the Army’s deep
futures wargame (Unified Quest); and the Eisenhower Series College
Program (an array of high-quality national security engagements around
the country).
I disagree with Hooker’s assertion that student performance at a
war college does not matter. Nevertheless, I am aware of the broader
conventional wisdom that a competitive selection to war college is
more important than attendance itself. But I do not think conventional
wisdom holds up across the board. Related to this, the claim that class
rankings are not used on transcripts and evaluation reports is not true
for all war colleges.
At the USAWC, class ranking has been part of both the resident and
distance programs since 2013. Our current system, aligned with recent
changes to the Army’s official academic evaluation report, identifies the
distinguished graduates—the top 10 percent—and superior graduates—
the next highest 20 percent of the class. The academic evaluation report
is the official rating entered into an Army officer’s personnel file upon
completion of a major academic program. The new version of the form
for USAWC attendees includes a section that requires a rank-ordered
forced distribution designation (distinguished graduate, superior
graduate, graduate) in a very similar fashion to the forced distribution
selections on an Army officer evaluation report. The Naval War College
has also identified class ranking—the top 5 percent graduate with
highest distinction and the next 15 percent with distinction.
The claim that war college performance has no impact on an
individual’s future career is hard to confirm. As one input among
many in a typical individual’s career file, I suspect the real answer is
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idiosyncratic by organization. My observation of student interest and
attention to overall war college academic distinction and other honors,
writing awards for example, suggests students themselves often perceive
such distinctions as valuable for enhancing their career prospects.
The Army academic evaluation report, in addition to noting
distinguished and superior performance, allows recognition of focused
work in areas of concentration, such as regional studies and special
programs, and provides space for narrative comments on awards and
other accomplishments. What difference do such items make to boards
and assignment officers? I have plenty of anecdotal evidence such
information has been perceived as important. I can attest to efforts at
the USAWC that have influenced officer assignments (most often for US
Army officers) based on student performance at the college. Establishing
better fidelity appears to require further study. But a blanket dismissal
strikes me as off the mark.
Regarding faculty, Hooker makes a statement I have heard often that
may capture a partial truth. He cites evidence that “almost [no faculty]
will be selected for promotion” and asserts services do not value war
colleges. Again, lore and conventional wisdom, whatever the original
source, may capture some truth. But this is a question that begs for a
baseline. Let us start with the obvious fact many war college military and
civilian faculty are already senior leaders. Colonels and Navy captains
(O-6s) are senior ranks. Many State Department faculty hold one- and
two-star equivalent ranks of counselor or minister counselor. Active and
retired members of the senior executive service—general/flag officer
equivalents—are also well-represented among war college faculty.
Turning to nongovernment civilian faculty, war college faculty exhibit
profiles of rather remarkable senior professionals.
As to the matter of promotion after a faculty assignment, I believe
more research might be in order. What number would constitute more
than “almost none”? I have personal experience within the past eight
years with five US Army general officers who served as war college
faculty (Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson and Brigadier General
Patrick J. Donahoe at the Naval War College as well as Brigadier General
Brian Cashman, Brigadier General Susie S. Kuilan, and Major General
Gregg F. Martin at the Army War College).
Nevertheless, I agree with the more general point that service on
a war college faculty should be more career enhancing. Services would
do well to think of war college faculty as a “second graduating class”
deserving greater consideration for future promotion and assignments.
This approach would be in line with how duty as a service academy
instructor can have beneficial results and in line with positive examples
of general/flag officers in World War II who had faculty experience
before that war.
Regarding the national standing of civilian war college professors,
I again challenge Hooker to be more rigorous. My anecdotal evidence
suggests very impressive junior scholars exist across the PME enterprise.
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Of course, given war colleges are primarily schools of professional
education and practice, dismissing senior practical experience of both
civilian and uniformed faculty seems inappropriate. Many civilian
faculty are widely respected in senior government circles—the primary
audience for the war colleges’ graduates and ideas.
The “industrial age, one-size-fits-all” critique appears to be a
strawman that falls apart with just a quick glance across the literature
Hooker cites, and a brief read into each of the war college’s programs.
The six war colleges are certainly not cookie cutter replicas of each
other, and they do not all follow the same developmental models. As
pointed out earlier, they represent many healthy competitive features of
jointness itself.
I have visited, attended, or studied several civilian public policy
programs—the closest civilian counterparts to war colleges—and the
war colleges compare favorably. Both sets of programs are very much
of the current age and confront the challenges of information, of
technology, and of intertwined, interdisciplinary subjects that make war
and other major governance issues such wicked problems. Maybe it is
just me, but the industrial age metaphor does not resonate.
I found another minor point confusing if not inaccurate: one of
the first endnotes states, “Civilian faculty members write most PME
critiques.” My quick tally of sources cited by Hooker in the body and
notes of the article yields a heavy majority of individuals I would
categorize as military or military faculty, including epigraphs at the start
of the article from retired Army General Martin Dempsey and retired
Marine Corps General James Mattis. Personally, I find it appropriate
and healthy that military professionals are active in critiquing and
challenging professional military education.
Some other minor points beg for clarity. I concur with Hooker’s call
to consider better ways to build experiential learning such as increased
simulation, war gaming, and exercises into war college curriculum.
But he does so without evidence or baseline as to what is already
happening. I am familiar with evidence, especially at the USAWC,
that reflects increased experiential learning through staff rides, war
games, simulations, case studies, exercises, and a variety of roll-playing
activities. I have heard and read passionate pleas for greater attention to
certain techniques—such as the use of board games, strategy exercises,
and decision-forcing case studies—that helpfully contribute to debates
over how to invest our students’ educational time. But the debate is a
broader one that constantly seeks to balance myriad techniques—some
as ancient, yet still as relevant, as Socratic dialogue.
Many foregoing points are directed at assumptions, assertions, or
conventional wisdom that have questionable validity. I challenge them.
But I do not dismiss them. Hooker raises important questions worthy
of additional research and comparison across the war colleges. Overall,
Hooker deploys the points in the service of worthy recommendations to
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strengthen the quality of war college faculty, students, and curriculum—
objectives for which I count myself an ally.

Assessing the Situation: What Needs to Change?

As with any profession, expertise and practice must evolve as society’s
needs change. Tools, techniques, and context for applying violence to
impose one’s will upon others are not static. Hence, war colleges cannot
be static and thus risk stagnation. Furthermore, war colleges do not
stand alone. Within the defense establishment, war colleges are vital
segments of a vast training, education, and development community
that combines features tailored for parochial service responsibilities
nested within a common, overarching, joint professional framework.
Within US society, imperatives of healthy civil-military relations require
American military professional education to nest within the broader
national community, as one among many professions American society
needs to survive and thrive.
War colleges seek to prevent war but must prepare their graduates
to use violence or coercion successfully for security, liberty, prosperity,
justice, happiness, and blessings better associated with peace. War as an
instrument of protecting or realizing these higher aspirations draws on
specialized knowledge and expertise requiring deep study. Indeed, the
core professional expertise in the instrumental use of violence makes its
mastery through education much more desirable than its development
through practice.
Hooker offers valuable recommendations. Having reviewed recent
literature on PME in general and senior-level (war college) PME in
particular, my sense is we are ripe for a comprehensive review to assess
existing programs and to consider new approaches aimed at making war
colleges better.
What would a comprehensive review look like? Frankly, some of it
already happens routinely. The Military Education Coordination Council
(MECC), overseen by the Joint Staff, is a collaborative body empowered
and motivated by the Goldwater-Nichols reforms to improve jointness
across professional military education. Across the war colleges, PME
leaders compare notes with other American PME institutions and with
allied and partner counterparts around the world.
Responding to the 2018 National Defense Strateg y and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford, the MECC
is working to revamp the Officer Professional Military Education
Program to focus on learning outcomes, continuing a trend that has
been building in PME and the American higher education community
more generally. Complementary pairing of military and civilian
accreditation processes induces a healthy dialogue between communities
of national security professionals and representatives of other fields
of expert knowledge associated with higher education. Additionally,
MECC members are working to frame a new vision of PME and talent
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management that directly answers the challenge outlined in the 2018
National Defense Strateg y.
Additionally, drawing the threads together from the foregoing
sections, improvements should focus on how war colleges contribute
to talent management and should include several important endeavors.
War colleges should increase their emphasis on faculty quality,
particularly military faculty, as a means to improve student learning
outcomes. Additionally, we should do more to highlight faculty
experience—the tremendous value of our “second graduating class”—
who have much to give back to the profession in future strategic and
operational assignments.
We should, for example, take advantage of the authority to extend
select faculty military officers beyond mandatory retirement dates to
draw additional benefit from their professional seasoning. In addition
to rotating more faculty back to strategic and operational assignments,
we should identify serving national security professionals—military
and civilian—who should be given extended time to conduct teaching,
scholarship, and service using the war colleges as their home base.
War colleges should develop more fidelity about the experience,
talents, limitations, and interests of incoming students as a means for
assessing what might best assist them to meet the profession’s evolving
needs.
War colleges should more clearly understand student talent to better
tailor war college curricula to their anticipated future responsibilities
and assignments. We should start by giving greater recognition to our
students’ senior-level experience and expertise.
Program improvements should better leverage state-of-the-art
insights on educational methodologies, tools to assess strengths
and weaknesses of incoming students, and ways to incorporate
student preferences. We should consider increasing ways to focus on
individualized needs through mechanisms such as specialized elective
programs and areas of concentrations that better match students’
anticipated future assignment paths and interests. Given improvements
to collaborative tools, it may even make sense to share more experiences
across the war colleges using online, resident, or blended methods, as is
already the case with the JLASS-EX.
Finally, keeping faith with the war colleges’ roots as extensions
of military staffs, we should retain and even strengthen the manner
in which faculty and student compositions—such as research papers,
projects, war games, briefings, and outreach—contribute to exploration
of and possible solutions to real-world problems. We should continue
to provide relevant support through integrated research projects,
connections to wargaming efforts (such as Unified Quest), and through
our war college students’ and faculty members’ routine engagements
with national security leaders across the entire joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational spectrum.
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Conclusion

Professional military education has always focused on professional
practice rather than basic research, the acquisition of knowledge, or
the self-actualization of students. It is effective only if it contributes
to achieving American national security aims. National security issues
are exceptionally complex. War colleges are among the profession’s
key mechanisms for analyzing issues and working to develop effective
solutions. Fundamentally, I concur with Hooker in his aspiration to
make war colleges greater. But I disagree with him about how much the
war colleges should look like civilian academic institutions. Although
there are useful lessons and common approaches PME and civilian
academia can share, none of the civilian programs I am aware of are
adequate substitutes for any of the war colleges. I also do not envision a
civilian program that should be.
The United States possesses a marvelous constellation of civilian
and military educational institutions that stand among the best in
the world. Stepping back to view officer professional development
in its fullness, the complementary nature of contributions from both
civilian and military education is an obvious benefit to society. The war
colleges, along with the service academies, command and staff colleges,
and several other professionally focused educational programs, should
remain instruments with which the US military develops its professionals
to meet American national security requirements.
The armed forces should not outsource this interdisciplinary
obligation. America’s armed forces are able to tap the world’s best
civilian higher education system to supplement professional education
requirements. But the armed services have the fundamental responsibility
to educate and to develop their own professionals—military officers—
most prominently. Strong and healthy war colleges, driven by professional
imperatives and supplemented by academic virtues, are crucial to
America’s national security.
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